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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35677 (hereinaffer, 35677), district court case 
no. CRF-06-24866, and ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35684 (hereinaffer, 35684), 
district court case no. CRF-07-11983, have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. 
In 35677, Mr. Aschinger was initially charged with lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen; and in 35684, he was charged with video voyeurism. 
In 35684, Mr. Aschinger filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered 
during a police search of a computer that was jointly owned by Mr. Aschinger and his 
wife. The district court denied this motion. Mr. Aschinger then entered a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge of video voyeurism, reserving the right to challenge on appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State also 
agreed to amend the charge of lewd conduct to felony injury to a child in exchange for 
Mr. Aschinger's Alford' plea. 
Mr. Aschinger timely appeals from his judgments of conviction and sentence. He 
asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the warantless search of his laptop in 35684. He further asserts that the 
district court imposed excessive sentences in both 35677and 35684, and therefore the 
court abused its discretion. 
' North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinss 
Mr. Aschinger was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and 
video voyeurism. (R., pp.63-66.) The video voyeurism charge resulted from a search of 
Mr. Aschinger's personal laptop computer that purportedly revealed a digital video file of 
a young girl changing into a bathing suit under Mr. Aschinger's user account on the 
laptop. (35684 Tr., p.55, L.2 - p.56, L.8.) Police were in possession of the laptop 
because Mr. Aschinger's former wife, Kristen Aschinger, brought it in after seeing some 
pictures on the computer that she thought were inappropriate. (35684 Tr., p.1 I, Ls. 8- 
23.) The law enforcement officer that she spoke to asked if police could keep the laptop 
and search it, and Ms. Aschinger agreed. (35684 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-20.) 
Mr. Aschinger filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained through the 
search of his computer and any police observations from that search and seizure of 
evidence. (R., pp.76-77.) In his amended motion to suppress this evidence, he 
asserted that the warrantless search of the contents of the computer violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because Ms. Aschinger did not have actual or apparent authority to 
consent to search Mr. Aschinger's files on the computer. (R., pp.117-I 19.) 
At the hearing on Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress, the State presented 
testimony from two police officers involved in the investigation of the charges at issue in 
this case, as well as Mr. Aschinger's former wife.' (35684 ~ r . ~ ,  p.11, Ls.10-17, p.32, 
The district court also heard argument at this hearing regarding the potential use of 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and the potential joinder of four charges. (35684 Tr., p.5, L.16 - 
p.6, L.20.) Since the district court's rulings on these issues were not preserved as part 
of the conditional guilty plea in this case, this portion of the pre-trial hearing will not be 
included as part of the statement of facts and course of proceedings for purposes of this 
appeal. 
Ls.18-23, p.45, Ls.1-4.) Ms. Aschinger initially brought the laptop to the Post Falls 
Police Department while she and Mr. Aschinger were in the process of a divorce. 
(35684Tr., p.11, L.23-p.13, L.1.) 
Ms. Aschinger testified that she was looking at digital photographs of her children 
on the laptop when she saw other pictures that caused her concern. (35684 Tr., p.13, 
L.8 - p.14, L.14.) Some of these pictures were pornographic in nature. (35684 
Tr., p.19, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Aschinger related that she and her husband had separate user 
accounts for the laptop, although they both used the computer. (35684 Tr., p.15, Ls.23- 
25; p.17, Ls.4-21.) Ms. Aschinger was uncertain as to whether the separate user 
accounts had individual passwords, or whether Mr. Aschinger had a password 
specifically for his user account. (35684 Tr., p.17, L.15 - p.18, L.4.) 
When Ms. Aschinger originally brought the computer in to the Post Falls Police 
Department, she spoke with Officer Dave Beck. (35684 Tr., p.32, L.18 - p.34, L.5.) 
Ms. Aschinger showed the officer digital pictures on the laptop of a young girl, S.P., with 
a bathing suit on. (35684 Tr., p.35, Ls.5-13.) According to the officer, Ms. Aschinger 
was able to access these pictures without any apparent difficulty. (35684 Tr., p.35, L.22 
- p.36, L.6.) After showing Officer Beck the pictures, Ms. Aschinger agreed to leave the 
computer with the officer so that he could access the contents of the laptop. (35684 
Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.12.) She also provided law enforcement with a letter giving 
consent to search the laptop a few weeks later. (35684 Tr., p.38, Ls.11-15.) 
Because there are two volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, citations to 
the transcript will be made in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court case number 
under which that transcript was produced. 
After the laptop was left with the Post Falls Police Department, it was eventually 
searched by Officer Mark Brandtl. (35684 Tr., p.45, Ls.1-24.) There were at least three 
user accounts listed on the laptop: KNA, VPA, and KID. (35684 Tr., p.50, Ls.7-11.) 
Ms. Aschinger testified that she believed her user account was "KNA." (35684 Tr., p.20, 
Ls.1-4.) Despite the fact that Ms. Aschinger had a different user account than her 
husband, Officer Brandtl was directed to access Mr. Aschinger's user account - "VPA." 
(35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15.) 
Officer Brandtl used a computer forensics program to create a copy of the hard 
drive of the laptop in order to search the contents of the computer without altering any of 
the laptop's files. (35684 Tr., p.51, Ls.5-13.) Although the officer wasn't aware of any 
passwords, and didn't enter any himself, his understanding was that the forensics 
program being used to create a mirror image of the hard drive was capable of overriding 
password protection on computers and that the mirror image of the hard drive could 
"absolutely" be created without any passwords from a particular user account. (35684 
Tr., p.49, Ls.2-5, p.56, Ls.23-24, p.58, Ls.10-22.) During Officer Brandtl's search of the 
laptop, he uncovered several pictures of partially clothed and naked women, several 
pictures of S.P. in a bathing suit, a video file of S.P. changing from her clothes into a 
bathing suit, and still images that appeared to be taken from the video file of S.P. 
changing. (35684 Tr., p.54, L.3 - p.55, L.21.) While he testified that he didn't see an 
indication of encryption software when reviewing the images on the laptop, the officer 
also stated that such software, "could have been on there." (35684 Tr., p.61, Ls.23-25.) 
Officer Brandtl also testified that he would be unable, with the mirror image program that 
he was using, to determine whether there were password-protected files on the 
computer. (35684 Tr., p.64, Ls.19-25.) The officer also turned on the laptop and logged 
on to Mr. Aschinger's user account during his testimony, although he did not attempt to 
access any of Mr. Aschinger's files. (35684 Tr., p.50, Ls.4-25.) 
After the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Aschinger argued to the district court 
that police extended the search beyond that which Ms. Aschinger had already 
undertaken as a private search. (35684 Tr., p.70, L.13 - p.71, L.3.) He also analogized 
the search of the computer to the search of a home for purposes of the scope of 
consent. (35684 Tr., p.71, L.4 - p.72, L.24.) This analogy was largely based upon the 
common function and role of computers in modern life as the receptacle of our most 
private information. (35684 Tr., p.72, Ls.1-10.) Because police made no attempt to limit 
their search to just those areas where Ms. Aschinger had the apparent authority to give 
consent - i.e. those files accessible through her own user account - Mr. Aschinger 
argued that the scope of the warrantless search of the laptop by law enforcement 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (35684 Tr., p.70, L.9 - p.73, L.25.) 
The State responded that Ms. Aschinger had brought the computer to police and 
provided consent to search the computer, which was sufficient to permit the search. 
(35684, Tr., p.76, L.14 - p.77, L.16.) The State also disputed that the contents of a 
computer should receive the same degree of protection that is accorded to a search of 
someone's home. (35684 Tr., p.77, Ls.10-15.) 
After reviewing case law regarding private searches and seizures, the district 
court found that Ms. Aschinger was not acting through the direction of law enforcement 
when she brought them the laptop. (35684 Tr., p.80, Ls.13-23.) The district court also 
found that there was no evidence that tended to suggest that Mr. Aschinger had any 
password protection on his files contained on the laptop. (35684 Tr., p.81, Ls.5-20.) 
Additionally, the district court, relying on the case of U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 
(loth Cir. 2007), determined that Mr. Aschinger had moved his laptop to a "public 
space," without taking measures to protect the contents of the computer from public 
inspection. Finally, the district court found that the demonstration of logging on to the 
computer made by Officer Brandtl and the testimony of Ms. Aschinger showed that 
Mr. Aschinger failed to take steps to preserve the privacy of the individual user 
accounts. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls.8-17.) In light of this, the court held that Mr. Aschinger 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer and there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
As an additional ground for denying the motion to suppress, the district court 
concluded that the scope of the search by police did not exceed the original private 
"search" conducted by Ms. Aschinger. (35684 Tr., p.84, L.5 - p.86, L.4.) Based on 
these conclusions, the district court denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the warantless search of his laptop computer. (35684 
Tr., p.86, Ls.7-16.) 
Mr. Aschinger entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of video voyeurism. 
(35684 Tr., p.108, L.17 - p.109, L.20, p.115, L.20 - p.116, L.8; R., pp.178-179.) He 
reserved the right to challenge, on appeal, the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence that was discovered by law enforcement pursuant to their search 
of his computer. (35684 Tr., p.109, L.21 - p.llO, L.21; R., pp.178-179.) In 35677, the 
State further agreed to amend the charge from lewd conduct to felony injury to a child in 
exchange for Mr. Aschinger's Alford plea. (35677 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-15, p.10, L.17 - p.12, 
L.7; R., pp. 188, 190-192.) The State also dismissed two other charges as part of the 
plea agreement. (35677 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-11; R., p.192.) 
Mr. Aschinger was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years, with five 
years fixed, for injury to a child, and three years fixed for the offense of video 
voyeurism.4 (35684 Tr., p.153, Ls.9-21; R., pp.202-203,205-206.) Mr. Aschinger timely 
appealed his judgments of conviction in 35677 and 35684. (R., pp.208, 212.) 
These sentences were ordered to run consecutively with an additional sentence 
Mr. Aschinger received for a felony conviction in Latah County. (35684 Tr., p.153, Ls.9- 
21.) Mr. Aschinger's conviction for the charges in Latah County are not at issue in this 
appeal. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the search of his laptop because this search 
exceeded the scope of Ms. Aschinger's apparent authority to consent to the 
search and also exceeded the scope of her own private search of the laptop? 
2. Did the district court impose excessive sentences in 35677 and 35684, and 
thereby abuse its discretion? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Aschinger's Motion To Suppress The 
Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Search Of His Laptop Because This Search 
Exceeded The Scope Of Ms. Aschinger'sApparent Authority To Consent To The 
Search And Also Exceeded The Scope Of Her Own Private Search Of The Laptop 
A. Introduction 
This case presents what appears to be an issue of first impression for this 
Court's review: to what extent can the consent of a joint user and owner of a computer 
be effective to the contents of a computer that are stored and designated under another 
user's account. Mr. Aschinger asserts that it was objectively unreasonable for police to 
assume that the consent of his wife to search his personal computer was effective as to 
the files contained on the computer that were exclusively under his own user account. 
Additionally, the scope of the search conducted by law enforcement exceeded that 
conducted by Ms. Aschinger, so the evidence uncovered as a result of this search was 
not discovered as a result of Ms. Aschinger's private search of the laptop. Because 
Ms. Aschinger lacked the actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the 
files under Mr. Aschinger's user account and this search exceeded the scope of the 
private search conducted by Ms. Aschinger, the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless 
search of his laptop computer. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Upon review of a district court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion, 
the determination of whether a search violated the Fourth Amendment is a question of 
law that this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 146 ldaho 466, 469, 
197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008). The issue of whether a third party had actual or 
apparent authority to consent to a search is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. 
See U.S. Y. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1580-1581 (1997). While the ultimate issue of whether 
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is reviewed de novo, this Court will uphold 
any factual findings by the district court unless these findings are clearly erroneous. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Aschincler's Motion To Suppress 
The Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Search Of His Laptop Because This 
Search Exceeded The Scope Of Ms. Aschinser's Actual Or Apparent Authority 
To Consent To A Search Of The Computer 
Both Article I, section 17 of the ldaho State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendments of the federal constitution protect the right of people against unreasonable 
searches of their persons, houses, papers, or  effect^.^ U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho 
Const. Art. I, $j 17. "The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches 
is implicated when police search things or places in which the defendant has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Dominguez, 137 ldaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 
325, 327 (Ct. App. 2002). Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. 
State v. Smifh, 144 ldaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007). When a warrantless 
search is challenged through a motion to suppress, the "burden of proof is on the state 
to show that the search either fell within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the 
Because the ldaho Supreme Court has already determined that the analysis of 
warantless searches pursuant to third-party consent is analyzed in the same manner 
and according to the same standards under the ldaho and the federal constitutions, 
Mr. Aschinger does not herein separately analyze the district court's rulings regarding 
this issue under each constitutional provision. See State v. McCaughey, 127 ldaho 669, 
673-674, 904 P.2d 939, 943-944 (1995). 
warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id. If the 
state fails to meet this burden, then the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal 
search, along with later-discovered evidence derived from this search, is inadmissible in 
court. State v. Brauch, 133 ldaho 215,219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). 
A search pursuant to voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Dominguez, 137 ldaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. "The consent need not be 
obtained from the defendant; it may be acquired from a third-party with sufficient 
authority over the premises or item to be searched." Id. Common authority over the 
property to be searched is founded on mutual use of the property by persons who 
generally have joint access or control for most purposes. Reynolds, 146 ldaho at 473, 
197 P.2d at 334 (quoting U.S. v. Maflock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, n.7 (1 974)). 
1. Mr. Aschinger Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Contents 
Of His Personal Computer 
The Fourth Amendment protects against searches of one's property where the 
individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items searched. 
Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Whether the expectation of privacy in an item 
is "reasonable" is not measured according to an individual's subjective belief, but is 
instead measured according to whether that expectation is one "that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable." Id. (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
In measuring whether a party had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her property, it is especially important to evaluate the nature of the property itself, as 
certain items will give rise to a higher expectation of privacy than others. See, e.g., 
U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984) (concluding that a "container which 
can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on 
probable cause, without a warrant); U.S. v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (gth Cir. 1993) 
(noting that a "purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest 
expectations of privacy.") (abrogated on other grounds by U.S. v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 
1580-1581 (gih Cir. 1997)); U.S. v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (loth Cir. 1992). 
Here, there can be no meaningful dispute that a computer is the type of personal 
effect under the Fourth Amendment in which society is prepared to recognize a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts have recognized that the computer is a 
"modern day repository of man's records, reflections, and conversations." See State v. 
Nordlund, 53 P.3d 520, 525 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Additionally, "[blecause computers 
process personal information and effects, they require heightened protection under the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches or seizures." See People v. Gall, 
30 P.3d 145, 160 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting). Because Mr. Aschinger's 
personal computer was a repository for his personal effects and information, he had a 
reasonable, and a heightened, expectation of privacy in his laptop computer. 
While the district court held that Mr. Aschinger did not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his laptop, the district court's conclusion was predicated on an 
erroneous factual finding that the computer was in a "public space" and a similarly 
misplaced reliance on the case of U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 (loth Cir. 1246). 
(35684 Tr., p.82, L.14 - p.83, L.7.) In the Barrows Opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was deciding a question that involved a defendant who had brought his 
personal computer into his office and who had situated his computer immediately 
adjacent to a fax machine and a photocopier that were commonly used by all of the 
other employees. Barrows, 481 F.3d at 1247. The defendant also placed the computer 
he brought from home on a desk that he shared in common with another employee. Id. 
And he kept his computer on and running at all times so that any of the employees at 
the municipal office had access to the computer. Id. 
Central to the court's determination in Barrows is that: (1) the area in which the 
computer was located was a busy workplace; and (2) the defendant had networked his 
computer so that other employees who were also in the workplace could access at least 
some of his files through the networking system. Id. at 1248-1249. The Barrows Court 
specifically noted that the defendant: 
... knew when he chose to relocate his computer to city hall that he would 
be working in a public area. City employees and members of the general 
public passed in and out all day. The chances that a passerby might spy 
snatches of personal material over his shoulder, or sit down to use his 
computer having honestly mistaken it for a city one, were appreciable. 
In sharp contrast to the highly public location of the defendant's computer in 
Barrows, all of the evidence in this case shows that Mr. Aschinger's computer was kept 
within the confines of his personal home. (35684 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-14.) The district court 
noted as much where the court found that the laptop that was owned by Mr. and 
Ms. Aschinger and searched by law enforcement was "possessed within their home." 
(35684 Tr., p.80, Ls.17-18.) And a person's private home is not a public place. See, 
e.g., Long v. State, 666 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (public place is any 
place where members of the public are free to go without restraint and private residence 
is not a public place); see also State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476,480, 974 P.2d 1105, 1109 
(1999) (for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004, presence of social guests or persons with 
business at the residence does not convert private driveway into property available to 
the general public). As such, the district court's finding of fact that Mr. Aschinger kept 
his computer in a public space was clearly erroneous, and the district court's reliance on 
the Barrows opinion is without merit given the gross factual disparities between Barrows 
and this case. 
The district court erred when it found that Mr. Aschinger kept his computer "in a 
public space" and where it was subject to public inspection. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls. 1-4.) 
Because the district court relied directly on this clearly erroneous finding, the district 
court also erred when it made the determination that Mr. Aschinger did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls.4-7.) 
Mr. Aschinger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer that was 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Ms. Aschinaer Lacked Actual Or Apparent Authority To Consent To A 
Search Of Mr. Aschinaer's Private Computer Files And Documents That 
Were Contained In His Personal User Account 
As has been noted, valid consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. 
Dominguez, 137 ldaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. Married couples generally have 
common authority over the premises that they share, and therefore generally have 
authority to give consent to search those premises. Reynolds, 146 ldaho at 473, 197 
P.2d at 334. However, common authority over shared premises does not necessarily 
translate into the authority to consent to search specific items of property on the 
premises. Id. 
Third party consent cannot validate a warrantless search, no matter how 
voluntarily or unambiguously the consent is given, when the circumstances show "that 
the absent target of the search retains an expectation of privacy in the place or object 
notwithstanding some appearance or claim of authority by the third person." U.S. v. 
Block, 590 F.2d 535, 540 (4Ih Cir. 1978). The mere fact of joint access to, and use of, a 
computer's hard drive does not necessarily provide for actual authority of a third party to 
consent to a search of the other party's personal files contained on the computer. See, 
e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4'h Cir. 2001). 
In this case, while both Mr. and Ms. Aschinger had overall access to the 
computer's hard drive, the evidence in this case shows that Ms. Aschinger never made 
any attempt to access that private information that was stored exclusively on 
Mr. Aschinger's user account. Therefore, Ms. Aschinger did not have mutual use, or 
joint access and control, of the personal effects and information that was stored 
exclusively on Mr. Aschinger's user account. See Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 473, 197 
P.2d at 334 (quoting U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, n.7 (1974)). The police search 
of the computer was limited specifically to only those files that were stored on the 
computer under Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15, p.55, L.2 - 
p.56, L.8.) As such, the search conducted by police officers exceeded the scope of the 
actual authority that Ms. Aschinger had to consent to this search. 
The search also exceeded Ms. Aschinger's apparent authority to consent to the 
search. Apparent authority of a third party to consent to a search exists when law 
enforcement reasonably, even if erroneously, believes that the person consenting to the 
search has the authority to do so. U.S. v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1133 (loth Cir. 
2008). In every case, in order for such consent to be valid, the officer's belief that the 
person giving consent has the authority to do so must be objectively reasonable. 
Brauch, 133 ldaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707. This determination is judged by the 
standard of whether the facts available to the officer at the time would warrant a person 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the party giving consent has the authority to do 
so. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). 
In this case, it is clear that police were aware that there were separate user 
accounts for Mr. and Ms. Aschinger. We know this because the officer who conducted 
the search was directed to search for "the specific files that were mentioned in that 
report under the user name VPA." (35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15.) Given the heightened 
privacy interests that attach to personal computers, and the specific awareness of law 
enforcement officers that Mr. and Ms. Aschinger used separate user accounts on the 
laptop computer, these facts would not warrant a person of reasonable caution in the 
belief that Ms. Aschinger had the authority to consent to a search of her husband's 
private computer files under his user account. Therefore, Ms. Aschinger lacked actual 
or apparent authority to give valid legal consent to a search of the files that were 
contained on Mr. Aschinger's separate user account. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Determined That The Search Conducted By 
Law Enforcement Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Private Search Conducted 
Bv Ms. Aschinaer 
Mr. Aschinger further asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that 
police did not exceed the private search by Ms. Aschinger when they accessed files on 
the laptop that were not accessed by Ms. Aschinger. 
"It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search, even 
though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable unless government officials instigated 
the search or otherwise participated in a wrongful search." State v. Pontier, 103 ldaho 
91, 94, 645 P.2d 325, 328 (1982). However, law enforcement may not exceed the 
scope of the private search. Walter v. US.,  447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980). Where a private 
search merely frustrates a legitimate expectation of privacy in part, such a search does 
not deprive the owner of Fourth Amendment protection for whatever legitimate 
expectation of privacy remains. Id. 
In Walter, a shipment of 8-millimeter film reels were mailed to the wrong address. 
Id. at 651-652. When the shipment was opened, there were suggestive drawings and 
explicit descriptions on the film containers. Id. at 652. The party receiving the package 
thereafter called federal law enforcement officials who picked up the package. Id. 
Instead of attempting to obtain a warrant to view the films, the officers viewed the films 
using a projector. Id. Based on the contents of the films, the State filed obscenity 
charges against the defendants. Id. 
The Court in Walter noted that the fact that police were in tawful possession of 
the 8-millimeter films "did not give them authority to search their contents." Id. at 654. 
The Walter Court also held that the fact that the boxes containing the films had already 
been opened by a private party also did not excuse the failure of law enforcement to 
obtain a warrant. Id. at 656. The Court held that, "If a properly authorized official 
search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of 
strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of another 
person's privacy." Id. at 657. Prior to police actually opening the film containers and 
screening the films, the state could only draw inferences about what might be contained 
on the films. Id. Therefore, the opening and the viewing of the films was deemed to be 
"a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private 
party and therefore must be characterized as a separate search." Id. Because an 
individual retains a portion of his or her privacy interest where a private party has only 
frustrated that expectation of privacy in part, a search by law enforcement that intrudes 
upon what expectation of privacy remains violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 659. 
While the district court relied on the decision in Burdeau v. McDowell in support 
of its determination that the search conducted by police did not exceed the scope of the 
search conducted by Ms. Aschinger, the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Walter expressly disapproved of such application of Burdeau as a means of insulating 
subsequent searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (35684 Tr., p.79, Ls. 10-21 .) 
The Walter Court concluded, "Neither Burdeau v. McDowell nor Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire supports the proposition that private searches insulate subsequent 
governmental searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny." Walter, 447 U.S. at 660 n.2. 
As noted by the Walter Court, the decision in Burdeau dealt only with the seizure of 
property, not with the search of property; and, as such, the Burdeau Opinion does not 
apply to an analysis of whether a private search is impermissibly expanded by police. 
Id.; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-476 (1921). As such, the district court's 
reliance on the Burdeau Opinion was misplaced. 
Applying the principles articulated in Walter, the search conducted by law 
enforcement in this case clearly exceeded that which Ms. Aschinger undertook on her 
own. Ms. Aschinger provided the computer to law enforcement after finding some 
photos of S.P. that she thought were inappropriate and also finding some pornographic 
images on the computer. (35684 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.14.) She never testified that 
she had ever accessed Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.31, 
L.25.) 
In contrast, police searched over 50,000 images on the laptop and targeted their 
search to only those files contained on Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.48, 
Ls.9-15.) Like the law enforcement officers in Walter, police could not have specifically 
known the contents of the video and image files on Mr. Aschinger's computer without 
undertaking a separate search by opening up these files. Moreover, like the officers in 
Walter, this search went beyond the limited scope of the partial search that was 
privately conducted. Ms. Aschinger, by her own account, never attempted to access 
anything on Mr. Aschinger's user account on the laptop; and so Mr. Aschinger retained 
a privacy interest in the contents of the laptop that were stored on his used account. 
The police officers in this case exceeded the scope of Ms. Aschinger's private search, 
and violated Mr. Aschinger's Fourth Amendment rights, when they deliberately 
undertook to search the areas of the laptop that were exclusively used by Mr. Aschinger 
and that were not previously part of Ms. Aschinger's own search of the computer. 
In sum, the district court erred when it determined that Ms. Aschinger had actual 
or apparent authority to consent to the search of files and information on the laptop 
computer that were contained on Mr. Aschinger's separate user account. The district 
court also erred when it determined that the search conducted by law enforcement did 
not exceed the scope of the private search that Ms. Aschinger had conducted on her 
own. As such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to 
suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the 
files contained on Mr. Aschinger's personal computer. 
II. 
The District Court Imposed Excessive Sentences In 35677 And 35684, And Thereby 
Abused Its Discretion 
Mr. Aschinger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences of 10 
years, with five years fixed, for felony injury to a child and three years fixed for video 
voyeurism are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent 
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of 
the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 
771,653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wlhere a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 
(1979)). Mr. Cellan does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Cellan must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The 
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting Sfate v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). This Court reviews the length of the entire 
sentence upon a claim that the sentence was excessive. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
A review of Mr. Aschinger's criminal history reveals that, prior to 2006 when the 
charges at issue in this appeal were brought, he had a fairly minimal criminal history. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.) He also had no prior 
record of sexual offenses at all. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Given that all of the charges for sexual 
offenses arose at around the same point in time in Mr. Aschinger's life, and given the 
fact that he does not appear to have ever received the' benefit of any therapeutic 
resources to address these offenses, there is strong reason to believe that with 
appropriate therapeutic resources, and threat that Mr. Aschinger might otherwise pose 
to the community would be effectively minimized. 
Additionally, Mr. Aschinger was raised in a home where his parents regularly hit 
Mr. Aschinger with physical objects such as belts and cords, and even placed him 
outside in the snow with very little clothing due to his parents' issues controlling their 
anger. (PSI, p.8.) He also moved many times when he was younger, which was 
frustrating for Mr. Aschinger and led him to socially withdraw from many of his peers. 
(PSI, p.8.) The combined effects of his parents' anger and abuse with the lack of an 
outside support network quite likely had a contributing effect on Mr. Aschinger's current 
offenses. 
In light of the record in this case, the district court's sentences of ten years, with 
five years fixed, for felony injury to a child and three years fixed for video voyeurism 
were beyond what was reasonably required in order to protect society and to serve the 
related goals of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. As such, these sentences 
were excessive and constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Aschinger respectfully requests that this Court vacate Mr. ~schinger's 
judgment of conviction and sentence in 35684 and reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reduce his 
sentences in 35677 and 35684 as it deems appropriate. 
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